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The Afrocentric Project: The Quest for 
Particularity and the Negation of Objectivity 
John H.  McClendon I I I  
U n i vers ity of M issouri-Columbia 
This art icle is a phi losophical c r i t ique of a ve ry controversial  
paradigm within Africana Studies. The methodology employed 
in this paper is a phi losophical cr it ique of the epistemological 
and ontological underp inn ings of Afrocentric ity. The quest fo r 
a distinctive (metaphysical )  African ist perspective has cast 
Afrocentricity as a subjectivist approach to aff i rming the in­
tegrity of  an Africana existential condit ion. Whi le in  the course 
of African American intel lectual h istory a number of scholars 
and th inkers have supported the notion of an un ique Black 
metaphysics, Afrocentricity b rings to the table a particu lar  ap­
proach to the tradit ion of aff i rming an African metaphysical 
exc lusivism. What I mean by the quest for particu larity is the 
notion that there is a un ique Africana presence in the wor ld ,  
such that i t  stands antithetical to the Eu ropeanlWestern ex­
perience. I explore what I cal l  "weak Afrocentric ity," i . e . ,  a cu l ­
tu ral determinism demarcat ing the African and European ex­
perience. Afrocentricity, in  posit ing a cul tural  relativ ism, ren­
ders that not only is E u rocentr ism a false un iversal ity. but that 
universal ity per se is false. This denial of universal ity (at the 
ontological leve l )  has as a corresponding category the nega­
tion of objectivity (at the epistemological plane) . I examine the 
works of two leading Afrocentr ic proponents, Molefi Asante 
and Marimba An i ,  arguably two of the most signif icant con­
tributors to the phi losophical foundations of Afrocentric ity. 
Al l  d iscussion of ethn icity with in  the domain of a g lobal perspective 
necessari ly requ i res us to move to the plane, impl ic it ly or expl ic it ly, of a 
world view. The emergence of Afrocentric ity as a ph i losophica l  world 
view, i . e . , a theoretical ly substantiated world view consisti ng of the most 
genera l  categor ies i nvo lv ing  nature ,  society, h uman ex istence, and 
thought,  is most sal ient ly a g lobal approach to the existential matter of 
an African g round ing in the wor ld .  
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Al l  attempts, a l l  quests to aff i rm the human existence of Af rican 
Americans vis-a-vis the claims of racism and national chauvin ism u lt i­
mately center on the q uestion,  what counts as belonging to the world? 
The national ist response (of which Afrocentricity is a species) brings the 
question of belonging to the world to the forefront. Ame rican national ism 
is d iscarded and in its place some form of African national ism becomes 
preeminent. Malcolm X's statement, "We are not American but victims 
of Americanism" g raphical ly gives expression to the national ist rejection 
of Euro-American national chauvinism. H is privi leg ing of human over 
civi l  r ights has a crucial cu ltural counterpart, the legit imatization of an 
African American cultural he ritage as an autonomous trad it ion. For the 
Afrocentrists , what counts as belonging to the world is the existential 
aff i rmation of an African ity which entai ls determi nate ontologica l ,  epis­
temological ,  and axiolog ical impl ications. This quest is one wh ich has 
its g rounding in a national rather than a l iberal democratic parad igm. I n  
terms of intel lectual cu lture, the Afrocentric intel lectual imperative moves 
beyond inclusion in America to what can be best described as a crit ique 
and corrective of the traditional academic canon.  This crit ique and cor­
rective are the f i rst steps toward the affi rmation of African particularity. 
For the so-cal led integrationist (read assimi lationists) ,  this central ques­
tion remains in  a mediated form. What counts as belonging to the world 
f inds immediate expression in provincial terms, entai led in the more pa­
rochia l  question ,  what cou nts as be long ing to America? Hence the 
st rugg le for civi l r ights and inclusion into the mainstream of American 
l ife , includ ing the canon (s) of inte l lectual cultu re, are viewed as a neces­
sary and suff icient condition for the quest of belonging in the world.  
The integrat ionist is fueled by a f irm bel ief and conviction that this 
country is in  an essential way a good , if not the greatest, p lace for one to 
l ive. America's prime fai l u re, its greatest blemish,  for the integration ist, is 
its racism. The integration ist maxim is simply-el iminate racism and true 
democracy wi l l  su re ly f lourish. The integration ist ful ly embraces the l ib­
eral democratic paradigm. Nevertheless, the problem faced by the inte­
grationist is the fai l u re of l iberal democracy to embrace Black people as 
Americans. Langston Hughes' poem, " I  Too Sing America , "  is a stirr ing 
expression of the integration ist protest against such rejection. In  terms 
of intel lectual cu l ture, i .e . ,  the Euro-American academy, the imperative 
is inclusionary, the push for more Black faces in the academy and in 
textbooks, e.g. ,  aff i rmative action and mu lticultural education. 
The Afroce ntr ic cr i t ique and corrective cal l  i nto q uest ion the 
academy's canon,  i .e . , the prescribed corpus of l iterature which func­
tions as the academy's foundational elements. The Afrocentric project is 
engaged in a cu l tural war over the anchor of attendant assumptions 
and presuppositions underg i rd ing the academy. Hence, the mere act of 
inclusion,  of making provision for cou rses on the Africana experience, 
fa l ls d rastica l ly short of the Afrocentrist's aim of reconstituting the very 
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basis of what has functioned as the h igher  learn ing .  Ergo, Afrocentric ity 
is not  mere ly  an acad e m ic a d d e nd u m ,  bette r yet ,  it c a l l s  fo r a 
rec o n f i g u ra t ion  of t h e  w h o l e ,  t rad i t i o n a l ,  acad e m i c  e n t e r p r i s e .  
Af rocentric ity boldly sh ifts the discourse on Africana Studies f rom the 
marg ins to the mainstream of academic and intel lectual l ife . 
This paper is a ph i losophical c rit ique of Afrocentricity. What I mean 
by the quest for particu larity comprises more than the expl icat ion of par­
t icularity via a descriptive p resentat ion of the uniqueness of the Africana 
(here Africana is inc lus ive of the d iasporian experience) locus in the 
world but, as wel l ,  entai ls a crit ical d iscourse on d iscu rsive practices 
relat ing to Black Studies, i .e . ,  Africana, African,  or African American Stud­
ies. What is pivotal to th is d iscourse is the repud iation of al l  scholarsh ip 
on the Black experience which re legates and rest rains th is  experience 
to the level of an object of i nvestigation . The Afrocentric project seeks to 
counter such objectif icat ion by proffer ing d istinctive d iscu rsive practices 
which go beyond the pale of the t rad it ional d iscip l i nes in the academy. 
The determination of such d iscurs ive p ractices, theories, and method­
olog ies, the Afrocent rists posit , in the f ina l  analysis, ( if not immed iately) 
de rives from the African experience. Hence Black Studies, Afrocentrists 
cla im,  is a d iscip l inary focus and is parasit ic upon an Afrocentric para­
d igm.  
Several central points are contained i n  my notion of a ph i losophical 
crit ique of the Af rocent ric p roject. F i rst , this cr it ique is from a definitive 
ph i losoph ical perspective , viz. , d ia lectical mate ria l ism. 
Second,  the Afrocentric p roject contains a p lu ral ity of intel lectual 
threads, which form a fabric of thought, which at best can be described 
as a mosaic, i .e. , ind iv idual th reads which maintain disti nguishable qual i ­
t ies regard ing  analyt ical premises, e mphasis, scope , and d i rection ,  yet 
a l l  are woven together, and a common ontologica l ,  epistemologica l ,  and 
axio logical fabric, i . e . ,  a worldview or  weltanschauung. My crit ique fo­
cuses on a compos ite sketch of the mosaic rather than a detai led exami­
nation of the various threads and strands, though I give part icular atten­
tion to Molefi Asante's contribut ions due to h is prominence as the intel ­
lectual systematizer o f  Af rocentric ity, a long  with Marimba Ani's recent 
magnum opus, Yurugu. Arg uably, the i r  works constitute a formidable 
ph i losoph ical bed rock for the Afrocentric p roject. 
Th i rd ,  g iven the mosaic character of the Afrocentric p roject, I d ist in­
g u ish between a weak and a strong Afrocentric ity. This l i ne of demarca­
tion emanates from what I v iew as a metaphysical exclusivism whose 
focus is the bifu rcat ion of h istorical and cu ltura l  real ity into a mutual ly 
exclus ive relationship between the African and European cu ltu ral ma­
tr ix.  This j uxtaposition ,  when expressed in  strong Afrocentric ity, f inds its 
catalyst in eithe r an envi ron mental determin ism,  e .g . ,  the thesis of sun 
versus ice people o r  a b iogenetic causal theo ry where melan in  (or  better 
yet the lack of it) is said to have generated socia l ,  cu ltural , and psycho-
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logical  ant ithesis and antago nism,  i . e . ,  wh ite supremacy looms hege­
m o n i c  ove r A f r i c a n s  a n d  t h e i r  d e s c e n d a n t s .  I n  c o n t ra s t ,  w e a k  
Af roce ntric ity has a p ropensity t o  locate th is  metap hysical d i ffe rent ia­
t ion,  au fond, i n  soci ocu lt u ra l  struct u res and/or ideologies (world v iews ) .  
T h i s  latte r t h read i s ,  what may be termed , cu l tura l  dete rmin ism.  Th is  
contrast of  strong and wea k  Af rocentric ity should not be taken pejora­
t ively. Here,  the terms weak and strong a re used merely as heu rist ic 
devices to formu late typology for, o r  as a mode of d iscrim i n at i n g ,  the 
types of th reads i n  the Afrocentric mosaic.  
Fou rt h ,  my c ri t ique is  focused on the Af roce ntr ist p roject as a q uest 
for the aff i rmatio n  of Af rican pa rt icu larity where such an aff i rmation en­
ta i ls  a cr it ique of  E u rocent rism as false u n iversal ity. The Afrocentrist cr i ­
t ique of  E u rocentr ism as false un ive rsal ity is g rounded o n  a cu l tura l  re la­
t iv ist stance, which i n  turn  eschews the poss i b i l ity of asce rta i n i ng uni ­
versal ity per  se . Un iversal ity, for  the Afrocentric project , is  a fa l se p ropo­
sit ion and , hence, is  re legated to the level of a pseudo p roblem.  T h i s  
ontological  d ismissal  o f  u n ive rsal ity h a s  an epistemological  counterpart ,  
viz. , the negation o f  a n y  notion o f  objectivity beyond t h e  conf ines o f  one's 
c u l t u ra l  matr ix .  The o n ly ep istemol o g ic a l ly val i d  rea l m  of i n q u i ry for 
Afroce ntrism , i t  is  a rgued,  is the Afr ican (and its attendant d i asporian)  
experience. Addit ional ly, a co ro l lary c la im is  made fo r E u rocentr ism;  i t  
can o n ly have epistemological  val id ity wit h i n  the terra i n  of the E u ropean 
(We s t e r n )  expe r i e nc e .  My c r i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  i s  d i rected at h ow t h e  
Af rocentr ic p roject g rounds a n d  j ustif ies its c l a i m  that u n ive rsal ity, as 
such ,  is a fa lse proposit ion and object iv ity (object ive t ruth)  cannot be 
obtained outside of a g iven c u ltura l  matrix. The fou ndation for these claims 
rests i n  assuming a metaphysical excl usiv ism and a n  essent ia l ist ap­
proach to both the Afr ican a nd E u ropean expe rie nce. What res u lts is  a 
h isto r iograp hy, estab l ished by means of a stat ic  o r  synch ro n ic method­
ology, which st r ips both the African and E u ropean cu l tura l  he ritages of 
the i r  d ia lect ical (dynamic and contrad ictory) deve l opment .  
The Afrocentric Critique of Eurocentrism 
M olef i  Asante, i n  his The Afrocentric Idea, states that his work is  "a 
rad ical  c ri t ique of the E u rocentric ideology that masq uerades as a u n i ­
versal v iew . . .  " 1 So h i s  cr i t ique is  a i med a t  E u rocentr ism as fa lse u n i ­
ve rsa l ity. He f u r t h e r  states, " I  am not q uesti o n i n g  t h e  val i d ity o f  t h e  
Eurocent r ic t radit ion with in  its context . . .  "2 H i s  c l a i m  is  that E u roce ntr ism 
has epistemolog ical val i d ity if ,  and only if, i t  is rest ricted to  a E u ropean 
(Western) doma i n .  The Afrocentric crit ique,  prima facie, does not ques­
t ion the legi t imacy of E u rocentr ism qua E u rope;  howeve r, if we go be­
neath t h is appearance, we w i l l  f ind Asante int i mately e ngaged in g iv ing 
commentary on E u ropean d iscourse. This e ngagement i n  E u ropean d is-
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course is an inte l lectual imperative wh ich derives f ro m  the effort to e rect 
a phi losophical foundation for the Afrocentric project. So despite his seem­
ing ly centrist perspective and commitment to cu ltura l  re lativism,  Asante 
enters the waters of Eu ropean d iscourse and d iscu rsive practice. H is 
entrance is ostensib ly to descr ibe,  for us ,  the E u rocentr ic trad it ion .  
Asante's d iscussion and interpretation o f  the  polemic between posit iv­
ism and crit ical theory has i mport because he argues his Afrocentric 
critique and (European) critical theory "are engaged in a somewhat s imi lar 
enterprise in reorienting  th inking . "3 Yet he tenders th is caveat : Despite 
critical theory assaults on the p itfal ls of posit iv ism,  th is polemic is an 
"Eu rocentric fami ly  debate over the nature of ideology. "4 So the s imi lar­
ity between Afrocentr ism and crit ical theory is  on ly a surface appear­
ance that when expl icated (deconst ructed) renders demarcated cu l ­
tura l  ontolog ies undergoing qu ite d ifferent intel lectual enterprises. 
G ranted, th is debate orig inates with in  the Eu ropean i ntel lectual tra­
d it ion (as does the Marxist/Freudian polemic which Asante also com­
ments on) ;  nevertheless I am compel led to br ing i nto bold re l ief the g lar­
ing  fact, that today these polemics are not constra ined by its Eu ropean 
or ig ins .  I ndeed , the above polemics are p resently waged on an i nterna­
t ional  (g lobal) p lane outside of the Eu ropeanlWestern cultural terra in .  
So the fact remains that the genesis of aforesaid polemics does not, in  
any way, conf ine the i r  ep istemolog ical val id ity and ve racity narrowly to 
E u ropean (Western) concerns. Asante charges c rit ical theorists with ar­
rogance due to thei r ignorance o r  lack of appreciation of the African 
conception of the uni ty of rea l ity. Even if we assume the veracity of th is 
c la im ,  the q uestion before us is how does a fai l u re to appreciate the 
African concept ion of the un ity of reality become equ iva lent to arrogance 
and thus Eu rocentrism? The Afrocentric cr it ique of Eu rocentr ism here 
involves a conflat ion of categories where ,  by v i rtue of the i r  Eu ropean 
orig i n ,  al l such categories must be seen as E u rocentrist. Just as Asante 
arg ues e lsewhere to be African is not necessari ly to be Afrocentric, would 
not th is  ho ld  true fo r E u ropeans and E u rocentr is m ?5 What then is  
Eu rocentrism? How may we d iscern the d ifference between what is s im­
p ly E u ropean from Eurocentrism? Is  one's engagement in the Eu ropean 
i nte l lectua l  trad it ion a suff ic ient cond it ion fo r mak ing the charge of 
E u rocentr ism? In Molef i 's analysis,  there is no exemplar  of a differentia 
specifica which we may employ to d iscrim inate between the two. So the 
c rit ical theory/positivist and the Marxist/Freudian debates are described 
with in the Eurocentric trad it ion because of the simple identity (conflation)  
of the categories Eu ropean and Eu rocentr ist. For Asante, the cri t ique of 
Eu rocentr ism is not a p rocess whereby what is Eu ropean is d ifferenti­
ated from Eurocentrism. Asante te l l s  us ,  "[t]he inval id ity of an idea arises, 
not from its exponents , but from its own fundamental f laws . "6 I strong ly 
agree with th is asse rtion ,  however, and unfortunately, Asante fai ls to 
fol low his own assertion and instead fal ls  into the trap of the genetic 
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fal lacy. A genetic fa l lacy is one whereby the genes is of an idea becomes 
the basis for its inval id ity. In this case, the European orig in of ideas is  a 
sufficient condit ion to c la im Eurocentrism. Here it is important to note 
this same l ine of reason ing continues with his rejection of Marxism. He 
argues, " [b]ut because i t  [Marxism] emerged from the western conscious­
ness, Marxism is mechanical in its approach to social understanding 
and development. . .  " 7 The assumption not only entai ls that Marxism is 
mechanical (desp ite Marxist dia lectics) ,  but it includes the ludicrous pre­
supposition that Western consciousness per se is i ntr insical ly mechani­
cal . Asante's essent ia l ist method in describ ing and analyzing both Euro­
pean and African thought is what is most mechanical here .  He ignores 
the long history of inte l lectual  exchange and specifica l ly  phi losoph ical 
discou rse in Europe where there were/are many proponents of a dy­
namic, dialectical approach to nature,  society, and thought itself. Marx­
ism was/is a prominent voice in the Western phi losophical t radition of 
d ia lectical th ink ing start ing from Heracl itus on up to Hegel and even 
encompassing a number of the critical theorists a la the Frankfurt School ,  
a po int which was wel l  understood by a wide spectrum of  Black phi loso­
phers inc lud ing :  Wi l l iam Ferris, George G. M .  James, C. L. R. James, 
Martin Luther King Jr. ,  Charles Leander Hi l l ,  Kwame Nkrumah, and Sekou 
Toure. Consequent ly, Asante's assertion regarding Western thought as 
endemical ly mechanistic man ifests both an ignorance of European and 
Africana inte l lectual h istory. A poor commentary for a th inker  who seeks 
to establ ish a phi losophical g rounding and a parad igmatic foundation for 
Africana Studies. 
Asante's essentia l ism does an addit ional disservice to African real i ­
t ies. An essentia l ist view of Africa effect ively arrests the dialectical con­
stitution and compos ition of an African heritage and cu ltu ral trad it ions. 
Rather than his mono l ith ic paradigm ( i .e. , the African conception of un ity, 
real ity, values etc . ) ,  we have the dialectical interconnection of unity and 
diversity (the un ity of opposites) , which brings into focus both the iden­
tity and d ifference which has character ized the African experience from 
the days of Kemet to the present. 
I want to propose a d ifferent method for determin ing not only what is 
meant by Eurocentrism,  but also suggest a way to d isclose all forms of 
centrism. By doing so, it becomes possible to show how one may sub­
ject centrism to a crit ique of its fundamental f laws. My claim is that eth­
nocentrism is f lawed because it centers real ity around a g iven ethnic 
group. Such center ing ,  by inference, devalues a l l  other groups by v i rtue 
of the i r  not being members of the central  group. Eurocentrism is a spe­
cies of ethnocentrism. Here the center becomes Europe (the West) and 
thus al l g roups outside of the European (Western) experience are infer­
ent ia l ly deval ued . My critique is aimed not at Europe, as the point of 
orig in ,  but at the centrist perspective which re legates al l  others to a lesser 
status and place in the world . The danger in Eurocentrism is precisely its 
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centrist cast ing .  E u rope per 5e (as a category) is value neutra l .  By that I 
mean socio-cu ltu ral phenomena emanat ing out of E u rope, by v i rtue of 
their  genesis, are neither endemical ly nor i ntrinsical ly good or bad , p ro­
gressive or reactionary, beautifu l  or ug ly. Fol lowing this l ine of reason­
ing ,  Afrocentris m ,  via its commitment to a centr ist parad igm,  is a spe­
cies of ethnocentrism and is subject to the same fundamental f laws of 
E u rocentrism ,  viz. , devalu ing that which is not African . The emergence 
of fa lse un iversal ity (what the Afrocentric p roject aims to crit ique and 
correct) logica l ly fo l lows from the center ing of a given group.  The privi­
leging (center ing) of a g iven g roup p resu pposes al l  other groups are at 
best satel l ites in  a cu l tural orb it around the central g roup.  However, if it is 
arg ued that each group by vi rtue of its own cu ltu ral matrix has epistemo­
log ical val id ity, as long as it remains with in  its domai n ,  what resu lts is an 
ontological formulat ion whereby rea l ity is seen as a monadology without 
a Leibnizian pre-establ ished harmony. 
This scheme of a un iverse of centers (centr isms) where autonomy 
(objectivity) is g ranted on ly with i n  the l i mits of a g iven cu ltural matrix is a 
re lativism which d i rects us into the swam p  of subjectivism . The method­
ologica l  imp l icat ions for Afrocentrism , tout court, is a str ingent subjectiv­
ism.  Asante arg ues, " I do not castigate any other method , for all meth­
ods are val id with in their  context . "8 This context, for Asante , is a cu l tural 
one specifical ly situat ing Africa (and E u rope) as a cu ltural whole and, 
thus, h is  proposal for cente r ing with in  an Af rican cu ltural matrix. The 
nagging p roblem for al l  re lativists, and specifical ly Asante's Afrocentrism, 
is the paradox of incommensu rabi l ity. I n  the case of Afrocentrism,  the 
paradox of the incommensurabi l ity is exempl if ied in  the re lat ionship be­
tween the cu l tural he ritage of Africa and E u rope. If one claims what is 
t rue for E u rope may be false for Africa and vice versa , then on what 
basis can we determine truth o r  falS ity? We are confronted with this ques­
t ion s ince o u r  c u ltu re-boundedness constr icts us ep istemolog ical ly, 
ontolog ical ly, and axio logical ly. 
Part of the ambigu ity in Asante's undertak ing is that he offers opin­
ions on such "Western" intel lectual  issues and ph i losoph ical problems 
as the mind/body problem and ideal ism/materia l ism debate, and prof­
fers phi losoph ical j udg ment on such fig u res as Protago ras, Aristot le,  
Sartre, Hege l ,  Marx ,  Kuhn ,  and Feyerbend ,  among others.  Yet h is notion 
of a cu ltu ral bound centrism and cu l tural re lativism,  in  fact, nu l l if ies any 
opin ion , view, or  perspective he may have concern ing those persons 
and issues outside of the African world . In te rms of his own cul tural 
relativism , it is axiomatic that if one ventu res out of h is/her cu ltural cen­
ter to participate in  any other then that constitutes b roaching fa lse u ni­
versal ity. It is to take what is an Afr ican ideal and apply it to an European 
real ity. The r ight to speak (or rather rightly speaking) req u i res residence 
in a given cu l tural context. As such ,  th is man ifestat ion of the paradox of 
incommensura l ity or re lativ ism s imply means there is no way one can 
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assert the truth or  falsity, the good or bad , the beauty or  ugl i ness of any 
proposition or thing beyond one's cultural  boundaries because there is 
no common domain or  intersect ing terra in .  Cultural matrix conceived as 
autonomous centers, islands in themse lves, or monads in se lf-contain­
ment, can offer no basis for objective truth or fals ity beyond the bounds 
of a particular culture. Essentia l ly, what is true or false is re lative to par­
t icularity. 
The i rony of it a l l  is that the very crit ique of false un iversal ity is un­
de rmined because if fa lse un iversal ity is a value of Eurocentrism then it 
may not be fa lse f rom the standpo int of Eu rocentr ism. Re lat ive to 
Eurocentr ism, it is a true un iversal ity. Corresponding ly, it may be re lat ive 
to Afrocentricity, viewed as a false un iversal ity. There is no objective 
grounds to claim false universal ity, on ly re lative ground which makes it 
an either/or proposit ion. Either its true or fa lse depending on one's cul­
tural reference point. 
Asante posits the "problem is not in the expounding of Western cat­
egories but in the absol ute manner in which they are assumed to consti­
tute the whole of human thought" (false un iversal ity) .9 He is at this point 
diffe rentiating what is European (Western) from Eurocentrism, which is 
something he had fai l  to do throughout h is earl ier discussion .  This refer­
ence to abso lutism is none other  than the claim that false un iversal ity is 
Eurocentrism . Now, it is not European categories which are the threat, 
but absolutism as fa lse un iversal ity, hence the danger of centrism in  
Eurocentrism. The solution to this problem cannot have as its foundation 
an ontology which , in turn ,  g ives aff i rmation to a p lura l ity of particu lari­
t ies which have no objective support beyond the i r  l im ited ind iv idual 
spheres. The critique of absolutism, or false universal ity, by Afrocentricity 
is undermined by the very act of its negating the category of objectivity. 
Al l  particu larit ies, enshrined in a centrist shel l ,  wi l l  f ind the i r  quest unful­
f i l led by negating the very basis which makes true particularity a real ity. 
The truth of part icularity res ides in its dia lectical re lationship to univer­
sal ity. The un iversal as true un iversal ity, over and against false univer­
sal ity, must of logical necessity take into account what it is that makes for 
the commensurabi l ity of differ ing cultural  or social formations. In effect, 
what does it mean to be human? What is the common denominator or 
connect ing thread l inking the world's d iverse commun ities? The need 
for a category sign ifyi ng commensurabi l ity among d iffe rent cultural ma­
trixes axiomaticly req u i res a notion of un iversal ity and objectivity. 
Though Asante may be considered the lead ing theorist of the 
Afrocentrist project, the recent contribution of Marimba Ani  to the corpus 
of Afrocentric theoretical formulations is arguably the most substant ive 
work in the critique of Eurocentrism.  Her  Yurugu is both an intensive and 
extensive rendering of over six hundred pages. Time and space does 
not al low a detai led examination at this juncture ;  however, I wi l l  add ress 
her central thesis by way of summation. 1 0 
26  
McClendon - The Afrocentric Project 
We found that Asante, despite h is  conflat ion of the categories Euro­
pean and E u rocentrism,  concluded that a l i ne of demarcation was nec­
essary for the real danger consisted in  the abso lut iz ing of Eu ropean 
categories as un iversals .  An i ,  on the other hand , argues that European 
cultural thought and behavior is intrinsical ly absolutist. European thought ,  
for  An i ,  is Eurocentric. 
Yurugu as a moment in the movement is ,  no doubt ,  an 
apogee in  the chorus of voices comprising Afrocentric 
d iscursive p ract ices. And though her voice reaches the 
upper scale and contr ibutes some un ique improvisa­
t ional po l ish to the Afrocentric ensemble , she is not a 
mere soloist without accompanying voices. Therefore, it 
is crucial ,  i n  my esti mation ,  to contexual ize Yurugu as 
an Afrocentr ic text . The locus of Yurugu, with in the ty­
pology of strong and weak Afrocentric ity, is as a weak 
Afrocentric text s ince the overrid ing pr inc ip le employed ,  
by An i ,  for demarcat ing the African from the Eu ropean 
paradigm is cu ltural ly determined. Ani, as an Afrocentric 
proponent, v iews the art icu lat ion of the African-centered 
perspective, as a d ia lectical p rocess ,  whereby, the ne­
gation of E u ropean thought is the necessary ground for 
aff i rming African thought .  She states, " [t]o be tru ly l i be r­
ated,  African people must come to know the nature of 
European thought and behavior in  o rder to understand 
the effect that E u rope has had on our  abi l ity to th ink  
victor iously. We must be ab le  to  separate our  thought 
from E u ropean thought, so as to visual ize a futu re that 
is not dominated by E u rope . " 1 1  
For A n i ,  t h i s  d i a lect ica l  p rocess is ,  on  the one h a n d ,  " i n te l lectua l  
decolon izat ion " ,  and , on the  other, "cu ltu ral regeneration . "  The f i rst pole,  
" intel lectual decolonizat ion"  is the expl ic it crit ique of Eu rope, whi le the 
second pole, "cu ltu ra l  regenerat ion" ,  is impl icit ly contained in  the f i rst. 
Hence, the departu re, the rupture from European epistemolog ical p re­
suppositions is a logical pr io rity for the aff i rmat ive art iculat ion of an Afri­
can-centered worldview. With regard to positing  a c rit ique of the E u ro­
pean cu ltu ra l  matr ix ,  An i  shares a common i nte l lectua l  space with 
Ch inweizu,  Iva Carruthers ,  George G. M. James, Diop,  Olela,  and Bernal 
among others.  However, in important respects she takes a fu ndamen­
tal ly d ifferent twist from James, D iop,  Ole la ,  and Bernal in  how she situ­
ates Western (Eu ropean) thought general ly, and ph i losophy particu larly. 
When we contextual ize Yurugu with i n  the terra in of Afrocentric c rit iques 
of Eu ropean ph i losophy, Ani parts company in an essential way from 
this t rad it ion . Her departure rests on the foundational assu mption that 
27 
Explorations in Ethnic Studies Vol. 18, No. 1 
G reek phi losophy, and specifica l ly P latonic phi losophy, is the seminal 
germ for European imperial ism. Whereas Diop, Olela, James, and Bernal 
all claim that G reek phi losophy, and specifical ly  Platon ism , is grounded 
in ,  if not a wholesale plag iarism of, African phi losophical thought. 1 2  
My crit ique is i n  substance a phi losophical one. The constraints of 
t ime wi l l  l imit my discussion to the fol lowing points: 
1 .  What is the locus of Platonism in the history of world phi losophy? 
Can it be reasonably demonstrated that P latonism is (or in some sense 
is) a prototype of Western phi losophy? 
2. My second point add resses an epistemolog ical problematic. Here 
my concern centers on the subject/object d ia lectic where in  P lato nic 
thought demarcates these two categories and argues for the object ifica­
tion of knowledge. For Plato, this objectification s ignals the emergence 
of phi losophy as a science of knowledge ("episteme") which stands over 
and against mythology's merger and subsequent identity of subject and 
object. Ani upholds the identify of these categories and claims objectiv­
ity is mystificat ion. The question before us is, can one reasonably claim 
that the real ist e lements in Plato's epistemology constitute a mystical 
casting of knowledge? 
Albeit my critique, prima facie, may appear to be a modest under­
taking since so much more can be said about a text which is over six 
hundred pages , I th ink I can demonstrate there is a sufficient warrant to 
my critique. My focus is on the phi losophical anchors which ground her 
inte l lectual undertaking -- phi losophical anchors at the level of h istory of 
phi losophy and epistemology. 
Platonism and the History of Western Phi losophy 
The question before us is ,  what is the locus of Platonism in the h is­
tory of phi losophy. For Ani ,  Plato (though inf luenced by what she terms 
"pre-Socrat ic African phi losophies") seems to have gone beyond this 
inf luence and was the catalyst for a d isti nctive phi losophical stance. She 
argues, 
" [w]hat Plato seems to have done is to have laid a rigor­
ously constructed foundation for the repudiation of the 
symbolic sense-the denial of cosmic, intu itive knowledge. 
It is this process that we need to trace ,  this develop­
ment in format ive European thought which was eventu­
al ly to have such a devastat ing effect on the nontechni­
cal  aspects of the culture .  It led to the material;zation( 
J. H. Mc) of the universe as conceived by the European 
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mind--a material izat ion that complemented and sup-
ported the intense psycho-cultural need for contro l  of 
self and others. 1 3 
Whi le Ani  does not deny African inf luences on Plato (though she 
does not state p recisely what these inf l uences were) , she strong ly as­
serts that P lato was the in it ial and key Eu ropean th inker to br ing about a 
parad igmatic sh ift from an i ntu i t ion ist to a material ist v iew of the un i ­
verse. For An i ,  th is  sh ift from i ntu i t ion ism to  material ism is not confined 
to Plato's persona as it becomes the essential featu re of E u ropean 
thought.  Ani 's summation of P lato entai ls three crucial e lements we need 
to investigate. F i rst, P lato was i nf luenced by African ph i losoph ical cur­
rents. Whi le she g ives no d i rect evide nce in  the text of such inf l uences, 
she does provide references in  her fi rst end note. 
The f i rst endnote contains a refe rence to the Platon ic dialogue the 
Timaeus. There is no annotation as to why she makes this reference. 
One who is modestly ed ucated in  P latonic ph i losophy can infer the ref­
erence is made since th is d ia logue not on ly makes reference to Egypt, 
but fol lows the Egyptian doctr ine of the uncreatab i l ity of matter. Both 
James and Obenga, who are also referenced in th is endnote, make ex­
pl icit mention to Egyptian doctrine in the i r  works. 1 4 What is crit ical to ou r  
d iscussion i s  that both Obenga and  James (even more vigorously than 
Obenga) assert an Egyptian inf luence on Plato. 
Second ,  neither they nor Ole la arg ue that there is an epistemologi­
cal  b reak d ivid ing Egyptian and P laton ic thought, i nstead they st r ingently 
assert a cont inu ity with Egyptian thought. Both James and Ole la argue 
this cont inuity is based on  plagiar ism. Now, of  cou rse, the fai l u re to 
observe such an epistemological b reak in no way makes Ani 's  c la im 
inval id .  But even i f  we take as a g iven that they miss the boat and fai l  to 
recogn ize the Platonic ep istemological reputu re, Ani 's further c la im that 
P latonism is materia l ist does not ho ld .  
Whi le P latonic epistemology is ,  i n  fact , a real ist view, i t  is not mate­
ria l ism. P latonic real ism is real ist because it is an objective idealist stance 
parasitic upon a rat ional ist presupposit ion that mind is not restricted to 
ind ividual instantiat ions. M i nd for P lato, as with a l l  objective ideal ists, is 
a general independent category and not c i rcumscribed by an indiv idual ,  
existential , character. 
What Plato cal ls for in his epistemology is a shift from perceptual to 
rational cognition .  This fact does not imply intuition is absent from Platonic 
epistemology, for intuition plays a crucial ro le in  h is notion of anamnesis or  
recol lection ,  as we witness in  the Meno. Hence, P lato's rational ism in­
cludes intuit ion rather than excludes i t .  Reason has log ical priority over 
intuit ion,  but reason does not negate intuit ion's presence. I n  fact , P latonism 
needs intuition as a crucial component for recol lection .  
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I n  the history of phi losophy, the resort to anamnesis or recol lection 
is predicated on the notion of innate ideas. Rationalists, s ince they de­
value the ro le of experience, are intrinsically bound to resort to some 
notion of i nnate ideas, since ideas for rational ists are not derived from 
experiential encounters, as witness in Cartesian rational ism. 
Th i rd ,  Platonism, in  the history of phi losophy, is not a sh ift to materi­
al ism but ideal ism. It was precisely the p re-Socratic Ionian th inkers who 
began the march toward materia l ist phi losophy. Thales, often referred to 
as the f i rst G reek phi losopher if not the fi rst phi losopher, studied in Egypt 
and ca'me back a material ist. His material ism, as James and Olela show, 
is consistent with Egyptian phi losophy. The arg ument that material ism is 
a European phi losophy, and thus al ien to Africa, is not supported by 
historical evidence. Plato was not a materialist nor is materia l ism uniquely 
a European phi losophy. 1 5 
Plato's ideal ism is in  part a response to Heraclitian materia l ism. The 
other part of the equation in this response is Parmenides' ideal ism. What 
Plato seeks at the epistemolog ical and ontolog ical plane is a critical syn­
thesis of Heracl itus' dialectics and Parmenides' absolute ideal ism. The 
critical phi losoph ical question, for P lato, is the reconci l iation of the cat­
egories of permanence (Parmenides) and change (Heracl itus) .  
Why has Ani missed the boat regarding Plato's place in  the history 
of phi losoP�lY? I th ink her fai lu re to grasp Platonism in the h istory of 
phi losophy is due to her methodology. Her method is anthropological 
not phi losophica l .  Anth ropological or sociolog ical reductionism cannot 
describe or explain phi losoph ical d iscourse. Her attempts to break from 
Platonic epistemological restraints requ i res an epistemolog ical ,  not an 
anthropologica l ,  analysis. Whi le Plato's phi losophical d iscourse takes 
place in a social ,  polit ical , and cu lture context, and understand ing that 
context is very important, it cannot, however, be a substitute for a con­
crete phi losoph ical analysis of concrete phi losoph ical problems. To con­
fuse idealism with material ism is an error due to her fundamental igno­
rance of phi losophy. One reason James, Olela, and Obenga do not make 
the same error is because they understand ph i losophy and recognize 
the differentia specifica which demarcates phi losophy from anthropol­
ogy. Whi le anthropology and phi losophy are not antithetical categories, 
and indeed work together phi losophical anthropology they cannot be 
conflated . The context of a phi losophical doctr ine whi le dialectical ly re­
lated to the content of phi losophical d iscourse cannot be reduced to it. 
Plato's ideal ism was a phi losoph ical response to a concrete con­
stel lation of phi losophical issues which were int rinsical ly connected with 
a host of socio-pol itical problems prevai l ing in  Athens. Plato's attempt at 
resolving the ph i losophical antithesis between Heracl itus'  dialect ical 
material ism and Parmenides' absolute ideal ism in its pol itical ramifica­
tion sought the restoration of an aristocratic landowning rul ing class. 
Thus, any concrete analysis of the specificity of G reek phi losophy, any 
30 
McClendoll - The Afrocentric Project 
disclosure of G reek ph i losophy's differentia specifica demarcat ing it from 
any other cultural matr ix ,  i . e . ,  an  African ph i losophy cannot be uncov­
ered by Ani 's essential ist anthropological methodology. One cannot ex­
pla in the h istorical and g lar ing empi rical fact the pre-Socratic phi loso­
p hy, as opposed to mythology,  was material ist .  
Ani 's thesis that Europe is a cu l tural ent ity accents i ts cohesiveness, 
integration ( integral un ity) , and common features. But she does th is by a 
reductionism which asserts , "[b]eneath its deceptive heterogeneity l ies 
a monolithic essence; an essence that accounts for the success of Eu­
ropean imperia l ism. " 1 6  
The heterogeneity of G reek ph i losophy, for example, is not a decep-
tion; if is a h istorical and an empi rical fact. The concrete exp lanat ion of 
th is fact requ i res a method and theory which gu ides us toward an expla­
nation of what is g iven and not a s impl istic d ismissal of the facts. A theory 
or  phi losophy of l iberation cannot afford to say, " My mind is made up. 
Don't  confuse me with facts. " The heterogene ity of G reek ph i losophy is 
a fact. How do we, in seeking to u nderstand this fact, explain it? 
In part, Ani 's confusion is the resu lt conflat ing Plato's importance 
and inf luence in Western  ph i losophy with try ing to demonstrate that 
P latonism is a prototype of Eu ropean ph i losophy. The affi rmation of the 
former does not logical ly lead to the latter. I mportant and infl uential ph i lo­
soph ical doctr ines are not necessari ly prototypes for subsequent doc­
trines, but instead can serve to create d iffer ing responses with in  ph i lo­
soph ical t rad it ions.  A ldred North  Wh itehead's statement, "Western ph i ­
losophy is a series of  footnotes to P lato, " was not a c la im that P laton ism 
is a prototype in  Western ph i losophy (he understood wel l  how Aristot le, 
for example, sought to d ismantle P laton ic forms from ar id abstract ions 
to a concrete category) . Better  yet, P laton ism was a s ign if icant v iew to 
which Western ph i losophers in its wake , in  due cou rse, had to respond.  
However, could not the same be said of Hegel  for the nineteenth and 
twentieth centu ries? Are not Marxist d ia lectical materia l ism, Russe l 's  
log ical atomism, and James' and Dewey's p rag matism, in  some way, a l l  
responses (footnotes) to Hegel? Su rely no  one l iterate in  ph i losophy 
wou ld claim that Hegel ianism is the Western prototype for the n ineteenth 
and twentieth century? Platon ism i mportance and inf l uence cannot be 
reduced to a p rototype. 
I want to conclude this d iscussion on Platon ism locus i n  the histo ry 
of ph i losophy by return ing to the issue of why An i ,  i n  her crit ique of P lato 
(and Western ph i losophy) , depa rts f rom her Afrocentric forerun ners in  
the persona of  James, D iop ,  O le la ,  and Berna l .  What the latter group d id  
was to point to  the cont inu ity of ph i losoph ical doctrines;  a cont inu ity of 
ph i losoph ical doct rines, in which d ifferences regard ing  socia l ,  pol it ica l ,  
and  cultural context could not overr ide. P lato found in  Egyptian ph i loso­
phy and the State a model to carry out his reactionary aims. This conti­
nu ity in  ph i losoph ical doctr ines refutes the basic assumption of Ani that 
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there is a fundamental metaphysical exclusivism between the European 
and African cultural  matrix. 
On the other hand , there were differences in the context in which 
P lato did phi losophy and the African experience which inf luenced his 
thought. The latter g roup"s, James, Olela, andDiop, blunder was in  not 
demarcating the concrete context . The salient continu ity of phi losophi­
cal doctrines obscured , for them, the differentia specifica of context in  
which phi losophical discourse took place. Ani recogn izes that there are 
differences, but she locates this d ifference in both context and phi lo­
soph ical doctrine by virtue of her metaphysical exclusion of Europe from 
Africa. What both Ani and her forerunners share in  common is the fai l u re 
to take into account the d ia lectical interplay of context and doct rine. Con­
sequently, the locus of P latonism in the history of phi losophy objectively 
remains undisclosed for them. 
There is an additional point wh ich entai ls an ontological problem­
atic, viz. , the categorical re lationship of part icularity to universal ity. While 
it can be argued that the categories (universal ity and particu larity) should 
not be conflated,  conversely, they ought not be separated , for part icular­
ity and un iversal ity are correlat ive categories. By correlative categories I 
mean that each depends upon the other to exist. Particularity is not then 
a sol itary category as assumed by the Afrocentrist. 
The Epistemolog ical Problematic:  
Subject/Object Dialectic 
Ani's claims that P lato, by virtue of differentiat ing between subject 
(knower) and object (the known) and arguing for the objectification of 
knowledge, formu lates a "new epistemology" where objects replace sym­
bols. She asserts, " [ i ]n the previous and d isparate world-views, we see a 
knowing subject intimately involved in  the su rrounding universe. The 
acquis ition of knowledge involving an immersion in  this universe unti l , 
through sympathetic participation , meaning is revealed , expressed and 
understood via complex and mu ltid imensional symbols." 1 7  
Whi le it is true P lato's a im is the objectification of knowledge, it is not 
the case that th is in and of itself constitutes a new epistemology. Ani ,  
fol lowing E ric Havelock, establ ishes her notion of a new epistemology 
by contrast ing P lato's phi losophy to the Homeric poetic era.  The con­
trast of P latonic ph i losophy to Homeric poetics is, i n  fact, a contrast be­
tween distinct kinds of inte l lectual d iscourse, i .e. , between phi losophy 
and mythology rather than disparate phi losophical schools. The mytho­
logical use of symbols is consistent with the art istic form (poetry) of ex­
pression. Poetry seeks not the cognition of rea l ity, but better yet, it is an 
avenue for the affective expression (an emotional response and release) 
of and to real ity. Affective expression is laden with symbols, e .g . ,  meta­
phor, s imi le, analogy, and synaesthesia; however, ph i losophy and par-
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t icu larly Platonism is not void of symbol ism .  I ndeed , Ani  makes refer­
ence herself to P lato's use of a l legory, in the a l legory of the cave . 1 8  
The g rounds for charge of re if ication rest in  the p roblem of the ob­
jectification of knowledge. Ear l ier I said the objectification of knowledge 
did not constitute a new ep istemology by Plato. The break by phi losophy 
from mythology, a break which p recedes Plato requ i red the objectifica­
t ion of knowledge. Rather than the mytholog ical notion of the identity of 
subject and object which is an identity of i mmediacy, ph i losophy renders 
any identity of subject and object as a med iat ion.  Western thought has 
numerous examples of the identity of subject and object, from Berkley to 
Hegel , yet for all objective ideal ists it is a p rocess of mediation .  
The med iation of  subject and object is a log ical necessity for any 
and a l l  cogn it ive , as opposed to affective, u ndertak ing.  Even Ani fol lows 
th is logical necessity when she argues that we must move from "decep­
t ive hete rogen ity" to "monol i th ic essence. " Here she is cal l i ng  for a cog­
n itive p rocess whereby appearance (heterogeneity) and essence are 
not on ly not an immed iate identity, but that ou r  perceptions of the imme­
d iate appearance are d ifferent f rom the object ive real ity of monol i th ic 
essence. If the subject's immed iate apprehension of essence can be 
false, then it fo l lows essence stands apart ,  objectively separate , from 
the knower as subject. 
The movement from appearance to essence is an impl icit recogn i ­
t ion that the identity of  subject and object is not immed iate, thus in  some 
sense separate. If to perceive is  not to g rasp essence, the subject must 
be a d ifferent category than the object, i . e . ,  we must assume the objec­
tif icat ion of knowledge. 
Both P lato and pre-Socratic ph i losophers are on a d ifferent episte­
molog ical plane than mythology. Ion ian materia l ism,  for example, is qu ite 
d ifferent than Platonic idea l ism.  Thus, p re- P latonic thought cannot be 
reduced,  as Ani  does, to Homeric poetics. I n  the h istory of Weste rn ph i ­
losophy, the debate between rat ional ism and empi r icism s ignals a deep 
epistemolog ical d ivide about the ro le of the senses. The subordination 
of sensat ion to reason is not a s ingu lar featu re of Eu ropean thought as 
Ani claims. Hence, Plato's rat ional ism is not a s ingu lar European ph i lo­
soph ical trad it ion. 
Both James and Olela show that the objectification of knowledge 
and the pr ivi leg ing of reason over sensation is someth ing Plato adopted 
as a resu lt of his t rain ing in Egypt. P lato 's view of ph i losophy as a sci­
ence of knowledge ("ep isteme") is not or ig ina l  to h im or the G reeks. 1 9  
Hence An i 's assert ion,  
" Plato's reason is the den ia l  of sp i rit .  Reason functions 
to control the more 'base appetites' and ' inst incts . '  The 
E u ropean view of the h u man beg ins  to take shape 
here . " 20 
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is a d istortion of the h istory of phi losophy and the notion of rational ity 
held by the Egyptians. 
Eurocentrism is a false universal ity; however, it is  a non-sequ itur to 
claim, as Ani does , that un iversal ity ( in and of itself) is false. The episte­
mological and ontological points are corresponding phi losophical issues. 
Ani 's denial ,  on the epistemological plane, of objectivity (the objectifica­
tion of knowledge) is correlative to the negation of the ontological cat­
egory un iversal ity. And i nversely, a l l  claims that substantiate a real ist 
epistemology, i .e . ,  the object ification of knowledge, in turn give support 
to ontological claims of universal ity. Thus, the quest for particu larity (by 
the Afrocentrist) not only entai ls the negation of universal ity, but also the 
negation of objectivity. 
NOTES 
1 Molefi Kete Asante, The Afrocentric Idea (Phi ladelphia:  Temple 
University Press, 1 987) , 3 .  
2 Asante, 4 .  
3 Asante, 4.  
4 Asante, 4. 
5 Molefi Kete Asante, Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge (Trenton:  
Africa World Press, I nc . ,  1 990) , 6-7. 
6 Asante , 1 987, 8. 
7 Asante, 1 987, 8. 
8 Asante , 1 987, 1 80 .  
9 Asante, 1 987, 1 8 1 . 
1 0 Marimba Ani ,  Yurugu: An African Centered Critique of European Cul­
tural Thought and Behavior (Trenton: Africa World Press, I nc. 1 994) . 
1 1  Ani,  2. 
1 2  Ani ,  29-30. Cheikh Anta Diop, Precolonial Black Africa (New York: 
Lawrence H i l l  Books, 1 987) , 27-32. Henry Olela, From Ancient Africa 
to Ancient Greece: An Introduction to the History of Philosophy 
(Atlanta: The Select Publ ishing Corp. , 1 981 ) ,  1 9 1 -2 1 9 .  George G .  M .  
James, Stolen Legacy (New York: Phi losoph ical Library, 1 954) .  
34 
McClendon - The Afrocentric Project 
Martin Bernal, Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots to Classical 
Civilization Vol. 1 (New Brunswick: Tuges University Press, 1 987) .  
1 3  Ani, 30. 
1 4 Ani ,  Yurugu, 573. James, Stolen, 98, 1 01 -02 . Theophi le Obenga, 
"African Phi losophy of the Pharaon ic Period , "  in  Ivan Van Sertima, 
Egypt Revisited (New Brunswick: Transaction Publ ishers ,  1 989), 292. 
15 James, 42. Olela, 1 1 5-23. 
1 6  Ani ,  30. 
17 Ani, 39. 
1 8  Ani ,  36-44. 
1 9  James, 83-1 1 1 .  Olela, 1 9 1 -201 . 
20 Ani ,  32 . 
35 
